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Freedom of Movement in the EU
European Citizens' Initiative (ECI)
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This study was undertaken to estimate some aspects of the net fiscal impact of EU migrants in four EU countries Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The report outlines the role of Fiscal Impact of EU Migrants in Selected Countries migrants from EU countries as participants in the labour market, as taxpayers and as benefit recipients also. The fiscal contribution of EU foreigners has increased substantially in the past several years. Compared to 2009, inn 2013 EU migrants paid 31% more in direct taxes as their wages increased and more EU workers found employment opportunities in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. As migration accelerated, EU foreigners also paid 44% more on indirect taxes, as they spent more onconsumer purchases. EU foreigners in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK received 35% more benefits than they did in 2009, due to the overall expansion of the welfare state in addition to the inflow of EU migrants.
The two-week cycle of Commission nominee hearings closed on the 7th October with the hearing of Vice-President of the Commission Frans Timmermans. If confirmed, First Vice-President-designate Frans Timmermans will be in charge of Better Regulation, Inter-Institutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, meaning that he will have authority over the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) process. He will thus have responsibility over the management of the first transnational instrument of participatory democracy worldwide. This instrument is particularly relevant to political discussion at this time, as the European Commission is due to release a report on the implementation of the ECI in April, May 2015, three years after the entry into force of the Reg. 211/2011.
International migration is one of the key factors that shape our globalising world. An increasingly growing literature on migration reflects this significance of international population movements. This article reviews three recent books which focus on the role of nation-states in managing and shaping migration processes and examine the relation between national and human security. While the work of Elizabeth Mavroudi and Caroline Nagel takes a bird's-eye view of migration, it underlines the nation-state-centred perspective in migration studies. Gabriella Lazaridis and Wadia Khursheed focus on the member states of the European Union and analyse discourse, practice, and consequences of the securitization of migration which has dominated in Europe since 9/11. On the other hand, Innes's book also deals with securitization, but it concentrates on security seen 'from below'. Drawing onexperiences of asylum seekers, Alexandria J. Innes criticizes the privileging of the nationstate in security analysis. Taken together, these works pose both empirical and normative questions about the role of the nation-state in the context of migration. Although the works do not provide ultimate answers, they suggest potential future research directions. I argue that there are two problems which seems to be particularly compelling. First, what are thefunctions and the consequences, given its current ineffectiveness, of securitisation policy? Second, how can state security be reconciled with inclusive human security?
National judges and Member State governments have an obligation to be assertive about national interests threatened by EU policies, even to the extent of challenging existing doctrines of law, proposing new interpretations, and insisting on the proper division of judicial functions, for they have particular knowledge and understanding of the consequence of EU law. An unquestioning obedience to the Court of Justice and to established doctrine is not loyalty, but subversion of an essential legal dialogue, and a failure to play an active and constructive role in building a legal system which serves the goals and wellbeing of Europeans. The Brexit debate is a case study in this: despite claiming publicly that mass migration was threatening essential and legitimate public interests, the UK did not attempt to use the available doctrines or derogations to defend these, behaving as if legal orthodoxy was fixed in stone, and the only options were leave or accept. It would have been more loyal, more European, more helpful to Europe, to impose unilateral restrictions and defend them vigorously with evidence and good arguments.
What happens when a comprehensive right to free movement meets national welfare systems? If we look at the contemporary EU we can begin to see at least part of the answer and the resultant unstable social and political equilibrium. Free movement for goods, capital and services as well as people – the so-called four freedoms – has been a key component of the EU's identity as an international organization since its foundation in the 1950s and is closely associated with economic integration. A positive ideology of free movement linked to a radical experiment in open borders is uneasily coupled with a continued attachment in member states to social solidarity and cohesion associated with national welfare states. Trying to square this circle has unleashed new political dynamics that challenge the European project. This chapter links the contestation of free movement to perceived effects on welfare,declining trust in politics (which itself is linked to immigration) and as a factor underlying growth in support for Eurosceptic, populist and extreme right political parties. The political sensitivity of the issue was made crystal clear in a joint letter (Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior et al., 2013) sent in summer 2013 by the Austrian, German,Dutch and UK interior ministers to the Council Presidency calling for action to combat 'the fraudulent use of the right of free movement' and the resultant 'excessive strain on the social systems in the receiving societies'. Reactions to the letter revealed dividing lines within the EU, with newer member states as well as Sweden describing the letter as unjustified scaremongering. The EU Commission called on the letter-writing governments to produce evidence of such welfare abuse and said that the claims did not reflect the EU's own statistics (ibid.). In 2013 the Commission actually set out new actions to boost citizens' rights, based on statutory entitlement to freedom of movement. Jean Claude Juncker, Commission President since June 2014, made it clear anew that free movement was a core principle of the EU and not an issue on which he was prepared to make concessions. Opinion research shows that the right to free movement remains highly valued not only by EU technocrats but also by EU citizens themselves. According to the Eurobarometer, the 'freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU' ranks year after year among the most important issues related to a united Europe (Recchi, 2015: 1). Hence, as Recchi (ibid.) points out, it is not 'the euro, nor democracy, nor peace among nations, but rather free movement which epitomizes the EU in the minds of Europeans', as shown, for example, by 2011 Eurobarometer data showing that 48 per cent of respondents across the EU see it as the most important right attached to EU citizenship (Eurobarometer 2011). This chapter surveys both the origins and more recent contestation of free movement with a particular focus on interactions between free movement and welfare. It focuses on developments in the UK and Germany to show how opposition to free movement and to the EU (albeit of very different types) has coalesced within new political movements that can challenge mainstream views on the 'European project'.
A 'dually open' free movement system has evolved in the European Union (EU), granting EU citizens the right to free movement within the Union as well as cross-border welfare rights. Some scholarly literature and public debates have characterized the system as corrosive to the nationally organized welfare state, which will become a 'magnet' for the European poor. This paper examines how the German and Danish welfare states have responded to the 'dual open' system and its outcomes in terms of EU citizens' take-up rate of non-contributory benefits between 2007 and 2015. We show that the domestic responses were mostly restrictive and that outcomes remained rather stable. Our findings do not support the welfare magnet thesis but instead identify a tendency to a bifurcated social protection system for EU citizens in Germany.
In this study, the sustainability of social security policies in EU countries was analyzed by panel data method with multiple structural breaks under cross-sectional dependence for the 1990-2013 periods. The existence of cointegration was tested by Basher and Westerlund (2009) method and series were found to be cointegrated. Cointegration coefficients were estimated by AMG method and it was determined that social security policies are sustainable in a weak form in these countries; when the social security systems' expenditure is increased by 1%, revenues are increased by 0.86% and revenues of the system cannot compensate the expenses. Austria has the highest rate of sustainability of the social security system while Ireland and Finland have the lowest rates.
The negotiations on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (henceforth: ECHR or Convention) raise several complicated questions of a formal nature, e.g. on the relation between Member State(s) and the Union in a particular procedure before the European Court of Human Rights (Court of Human Rights) and on the coordination of the interpretation of EU law by the EU Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights.1 Considerable progress was made in this area,2 but in December 2014 the Court of Justice delivered its opinion on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, and this raised important questions.3 These issues will not be addressed here, because they are outside the scope of this volume. Instead, I will focus on a material issue, i.e. a comparison of the approaches of both Courts in discrimination cases. This may become important when the EU finally accedes to the ECHR. It is, however, also important now, for academic purposes alone, since it shows alternative approaches and raises the need for explaining differences between the approaches.
This working paper is based on the analysis of 28 national replies to a questionnaire addressing the implementation of the provisions on social assistance and economically inactive EU citizens in the context of Directive 2004/38 over the time frame 2014-2016.1 It presents main findings and is concerned with how the EU28 are implementing the provisions on social assistance and economically inactive EU citizens and what issues are relevant for the effective exercise of EU citizenship rights in this specific area of law. This monitoring effort is part of the 2015-2018 work programme of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence implemented by the Centre for Migration Law (Radboud University Nijmegen). The questionnaire was sent out to 28 national experts and focused on 3 main themes: social rights, family reunification and permanent residence. The other two themes are addressed in separate working papers (available here https://www.ru.nl/law/cmr/research/working-papers/overview/).
As a relatively new mode of governance in the process of European integration the Open Method of Coordination has triggered a lively scholarly debate. Besides historical accounts on the genesis and rationale of the Open Method of Coordination, and theoretical conceptualisations of it as a governance instrument, the rich literature about the Open Method of Coordination includes numerous empirical case studies. These studies produce conflicting accounts of the effectiveness of the Open Method of Coordination. Some scholars have argued that the Open Method of Coordination fosters at best cherry picking and results in the gradual erosion of the programmes and policies that constitute a European social dimension. Moreover, it distracts from efforts to create a genuine social dimension via hard law measures that would counterbalance market-led integration. Others consider the Open Method of Coordination as an innovative breakthrough with superior capacity to solve some of the complex problems facing European society. The purpose of this contribution is not to resolve this dispute, rather its aim is to unravel EU coordinative and supportive initiatives, ie EU initiatives that are addressed to the Member States with the intention to influence their domestic policies and legislation in the wider field of social security. Moreover, the aim is to assess the potential integration capacity of these activities based on their legal dynamics. These legal dynamics include: formal aspects such as the competence of the EU to deal with these issues in general and the specific type of actions in particular, EU general concepts such as supremacy of EU law and direct effect, and the type of incentives created to enforce and stimulate compliance with EU initiatives.
After the last EU enlargement, state borders have been partially replaced by internal border controls of state bureaucracies to regulate westward migration. Existing ideas of threat associated with non-EU migrants are accompanied by a 'new menace' referring to criminal 'insiders' who might profit from the freedom of mobility within the EU. Accordingly, social security and immigration policies are increasingly intertwined within surveillance practices of member states, blurring the line between welfare and crime control measures. Therefore, new geopolitical measures and local risk management strategies are introduced for tracing and screening mobile groups. These monitoring practices, such as spidergrams, are taking new forms in technocratic bureaucracies and changing the means of interaction between newcomers and administrative bodies in host societies. In order to understand how these welfare service based financial monitoring structures facilitate spatial population control, we need to understand how selective incentives are invented in order to make undesired groups voluntarily leave the executive territory of host societies. This targeted social sorting is a dynamic process, shaped by narratives of politicians, academics and the civil society, in which economic and ethnic connotations of migrants are regularly intertwined. As full EU citizens, large Roma populations now enjoy freedom of movement throughout Europe. The long-standingprejudiced perception of Roma as profiteers living on welfare, involved in illegal activities and unwilling to integrate has become a basis for Western concerns about a "threatening flood" of westward-bound benefit tourists. This has been used to justify new control measures in several Western member states. Based on empirical case studies, this study will analyse these asymmetries of surveillance within the virtual walls of Fortress Europe, and uncover coping of Central European Roma migrants in daily bureaucratic welfare procedures in London.
In this chapter we critically analyse criteria and concepts used by the EU legislator and the Court of Justice (CJ) in order to establish the place(s) where mobile EU workers 'belong' in relation to their labour law entitlements. In thiscontext the term 'belonging' refers to the fact that the mobile worker is included in the group that is covered by a given national system of labour law – either fully or partially. Th ey are benefi ciaries thereof and bound by it. Because of the private law character of the employment contract between employer and employee, the rules of private international law (PIL) play a central role in deciding which law applies to a given labour relationship with transnational elements. Nowadays, the law applicable to an employment contract is determined in all EU MemberStates by the PIL rules contained in Article 8 and 9 of the Rome I Regulation.
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